Tóm tắt. Khi cần đánh giá tính xác thực của một thông tin, giao thức Zero-knowledge là một giải pháp thường được lựa chọn. Nó được dùng trong các giải pháp về thăm dò tính riêng tư hay bảo mật. Giao thức thường có hai bên tham gia: một bên cần chứng minh cho bên còn lại một khẳng định là đúng mà không để lộ thông tin gì ngoại trừ sự trung thực. Hai bên có thể thoả thuận về cách hỏi và trả lời với nhau (vì thế gọi là giao thức). Có hai cách thực hiện giao thức: chứng thực không tương tác (hỏi và trả lời một lần) và chứng thực tương tác (hỏi và trả lời nhiều lần). Tùy theo ứng dụng, việc chứng thực có thể chỉ yêu cầu xác thực thông tin của một phía hay của cả hai phía. Bài báo này giới thiệu một cấu trúc đại số trên các khoảng và ứng dụng nó để thiết kế giao thức Zero-knowledge với độ tin cậy cao nhưng dễ dàng triển khai. Độ phức tạp tấn công giao thức là hàm mũ và độ phức tạp triển khai giao thức là tuyến tính theo là độ dài khoá.
INTRODUCTION
Many applications are used with requirements on time which form of durations. In this paper, we introduce a new product on durations. This product is proved to be a weak association. Applying this property, we can applied them in substantiating information problems. Substantiation protocol chosen is Zero-knowledge. This protocol does only authentication.
In Zero-knowledge system, there are two parties, called as a prover and a verifier. The prover has some valuable information (or some secret) want to exchange, the verifier needs that information (or secret) and wants to have. Once both sites believe in each other, the exchange must be processed and this phase does not belong to the Zero-knowledge system. This proof only takes responsibility for the honest prover to prove that he has a valuable information without losing the privacy to make the verifier believe (protocol). For the systems with lower security or under some circumstances, ones can use non-interactive methods [9] , concurrent [8] or multi prover interactive [6] methods for this protocol.
A proof is called a Zero-knowledge if it satisfies three properties [9] : -Completeness: if the statement is true then the honest verifier will be convinced of this fact by an honest prover.
-Soundness: if the statement is false, no cheating prover can convince the honest verifier that it is true, except with some small probability.
-Zero-knowledge: if the statement is true, no cheating verifier learns anything other than this fact.
In order to do these, Zero-knowledge systems uses some NPH problems such as finding Hamiltonian circle, and three-color problems on graphs as traps [?, 2, 3, 4] . If anyone who has the information to solve the problems, he can find solutions easily. Otherwise, it is impossible. In [1] , duration algebraic structure have been studied and issued some applications. In this research, we put forward a new application of Zero-knowledge protocol.
AN ALGEBRAIC STRUCTURE OF DURATIONS

Definition
If there is no such t, the duration is empty and denoted as ∅. A new type of product between two durations is defined as follows:
The duration product of d 1 and d 2 is given by:
This product in D is closed because it is a continuous duration with two end points that are also integer numbers, but it is not commutative.
We will explain the meaning of this product later when we make a connection to the duration automata. To investigate the associative property of this product, we need some following basic results. 
Proof. By remarking the relationship between left and right bounds of 3 durations
, we only take care of the order of these l i , u i , i = 1..3. Thus, we can choose a representative value in each duration. From logical aspect, there are limited cases, so we can use discrete checking method by regarding l i , u i , i = 1..3, as integer numbers in durations. For a duration [l 1 , u 1 ], there are at most 16 possibilities to put 2 points l 2 , u 2 (l 2 ≤ u 2 ) into the intervals defined by l 1 and u 1 . For each 4 points configuration of intervals defined by l 1 , u 1 , l 2 , u 2 with random order (l 1 ≤ u 1 , l 2 ≤ u 2 ), we have at most 49 cases to put l 3 , u 3 into these intervals. Because the role of l 1 , l 2 , l 3 and u 1 , u 2 , u 3 are the same, hence the values of these end points can be considered as integer numbers from 1 to 14.
The truth of this theorem can be proved by running a simple program to check for all cases as follow. The results of running a simple program as shown below give us a confirmation for the proof of this theorem , 14] , l ≤ u, l, u ∈ Z + } be a set of durations with integer end points and values from 1 to 14. The pseudo code below is to check for associative property of the product of 3 durations as mentioned in the theorem 2.2.
Function check() { ok=true; for (d 1 ∈ D) and ok for (d 2 ∈ D) and ok for (d 3 ∈ D) and ok if prod(prod(d 1 , d 2 ),d 3 ) = ∅ and prod(d 1 ,prod(d 2 , d 3 )) = ∅ then if prod(prod(d 1 , d 2 ),d 3 ) = prod(d 1 ,prod(d 2 , d 3 )) then ok=false; return(ok); } Remark: Function prod will return the product of two durations.
In the following example, we present the cases that may happen between the product of 3 durations when checking for associative property. We can see that if the products of 3 durations with some associations are defined, then they are equal. A question raises: is the defined product of a given sequence of durations with any association unique? The answer as follows.
Proof. We will prove by induction on n.
-For the case of n = 2, this confirmation is true.
-Suppose the confirmation is true for n = k > 2 durations. We denote the product of a sequence of durations for δ k associations as
Note that the new duration can be a result of no more than other k durations Corollary 2.1. If δ 1 and δ 2 are two products of a given sequence d 1 , d 2 , . . . , d n , which are defined for any two associations then δ 1 = δ 2 . Corollary 2.2. If the product of a sequence d 1 , d 2 , . . . , d n for any association is defined, then the result is a continuous duration. 
Generating a sequence of durations from a binary string
When we create 3 durations from the duration d, there are 4 other end points we must specify. If r is a vector with 4 dimensions which specifies these ends (such as the length ratios between the three durations), we call r as a division ratio. ratio gives us (ordered from the first, the second and the third durations):
Dividing with different ratios will produce different durations, one can choose another ratio in which the constraint l 1 < u 3 < l 2 < u 1 for configuration 0 and l 3 < u 2 < l 1 < u 3 for configuration 1 must be kept. Ratios that keep constraints above are called suitable division.
We note that the product of a durations sequence hides the information from the way taking the product (theorem 2.3). Thus, people who know the product result can hardly know which association has been applied. Due to this characteristic, we will use the association information of durations which will be hidden in a binary sequence k ∈ {0, 1} 2n+1 , n ∈ Z + as an authentication key. Having choosen a key k and a duration d, the algorithm below will generate a sequence of durations x for a given suitable division ratio r.
Algorithm 1: Generating a sequence of durations for a given key. Input: A key k, a duration d and a suitable division ratio r. Output: A sequence of durations x uniquely corresponding to key k. 1. Read k from left to right. If the first symbol of k is 0, divide d by the conf. 0, otherwise divide by the conf. 1.
2. Read two next symbols ab in k. + If the last used conf. is 0 then if a = 0 then divide the 2nd, otherwise divide the 3rd duration of the previous stage. + If the last used conf. is 1 then if a = 0 then we divide the 1st, otherwise divide the 2nd duration of the previous stage. + If b = 0, use conf. 0, otherwise use the conf. 1 with given ratio r to divide the selected duration.
With a unique association specified by k, is the product taking on x defined? This question has a positive answer given by the following theorem. Theorem 2.4. Given a key k and a duration d. The sequence of durations is constructed in the algorithm 1 defines a unique association that makes the product result defined. All other associations which are different from the one specified by k will lead to the empty result (undefined).
Proof. By the way we generate the sequence of durations, we can build a binary tree using trees in the Fig. 2.4 where at each step, leaves are durations and internal nodes are the duration product of two its subtrees (childs). For each internal nodes, a tree with the height 2 will content three leaves (durations) and there is only one association can make the product of these 3 durations in order from left to right defined (specified by the tree). Other associations which are different will return non-defined products. So that there is a unique association for the sequence of durations can make the product of them defined For a generated x, k stores the associative information that makes the product of x defined, hence k can be called as a characteristic key of x. Key k specifies the tree structure (the value of the nodes depend on the ratio). If we define a function K : D * → {0, 1} 2n+1 which returns key k of the sequence x generated by the algorithm above with a specific ratio r and duration d, then K( x) = k. When the ratio r is changed, we will have a class of x which has the same characteristic key.
ZERO-KNOWLEDGE SYSTEM
A new Zero-knowledge protocol
Formally, a Zero-knowledge system can be described as a system including two parties A and B with an agreement on exchanging information (protocol). A has an important secret X and wants to proof to B this fact without exposing X, B wants to check if A has X or not. X has some important properties α of which can be aware by B, it means that if A knows α, A surely has X. In this protocol, B (verifier) wants to verify if A (prover) has X by asking about α. A finds the way to answer B without exposure X by giving B a simulator of α. B has a chance to check if A give him the simulator of α or not (with a probability approximates zero if A has not X). Sooner or later, if A is the truth, B can be convinced that A knows the 1. Changing end points (except leftmost and rightmost ones) by changing division ratio but keeping the product defined.
For 3 durations
at any tree level, changing l 3 , u 2 for the configuration 0, and l 3 , u 1 for the configuration 1 arbitrarily (but durations must not emptyset).
3. Doing advance equally up or down by a value to the whole end points.
4. Suppose the tree with height 2 at highest level (root at level 0 -highest) has 3 durations
Choosing a fixed point O in (u h , l i ) if it is configuration 0, or in (u j , l i ) if it is configuration 1, and doing the elastic change all end points: all the left end points to O changed at one ratio, all the right end points to O changed at one ratio.
Proof. Durations product depends only on the leftmost and the rightmost bounds of durations, thus case 1) and 2) will not change the product and its property. For others, these changes keep the product defined, and do not change the order of end points, so that the associative property will not be changed. We can easily see this by using the tree as in the proof of theorem 2.4 -A knows X, α and choose an duration d, a key k ∈ {0, 1} 2n+1 , n ∈ Z + . A choose a dividing rate r and use the algorithm 1 to produde the sequence
End points of durations in x will be kept secret.
-B knows X without α, the key k. At every interactive step, A will:
1. Chose an one-way function f .
2.
Choose an associative stable function H as in theorem 3.1 to change x into H( x).
3. Encode X and α with end points of durations in H( x) as input parameters to get f (X), f (α).
4. Deliver f, f (α) to B and let him checks if f (X) has the property f (α) or the product of H( x) is defined with characteristic key k. -Interactive checking protocol:
are durations in x, j is a vertex number of G, s = min{k : Complexity to break the protocol To break the protocol, attacker has to do 2 jobs: finding the correct order of end points in x which will create durations, and finding the association on durations which make the product defined (breaking function H). For a list of end points of the durations, to find the correct order (after applying function H on x), he has to try 2n permutations of end points for n = [|k|/2] + 1 is the numbers of durations. Finding the correct association is equivalent to putting brackets to group durations and there are more than 2 n possibilities. To check for all possibilities, he has to spend O(2 n ) tries (there are 2 possibilities in the tree at the height 2) where n = [|k|/2] + 1. The complexity to break the protocol is O(2 n × (2n)!).
One-side checking Zero-knowledge protocol
In computer security area, phishing are malicious falsified actions to appropriate sensitive information such as user name, password, credit card's information... by pretending to be a safe subject in some electronic transactions. Pretenders treat gullible users that the transactions come from popular safe and trustable websites, such as online banking, administrator or ambiguous domain name. Phishing is usually carried out by email or short message service which ask users enter sensitive information into a fake website. These websites have interfaces which look quite the same as the safe one. One of the solutions to against this attack is technical improvement. This part issues one method to against phishing using Zero-knowledge technique.
Suppose there is a web application working as client/server model. Users register information to server, in which there is a password. Problem: how the users can make sure that the later accesses will lead to the correct server (server of the service provider) instead of fake one. The proof of server works as follows:
• User access the address of the website and the server sends to the client a program which is used to hash an user's password into a binary string. This program must satisfy the one-way transformation property. It means one can not find the password from a binary string.
• With a binary string, user choses a duration d and generate a binary tree as in the Algorithm 1 with any suitable division rate. Basing on this tree, user can send durations from the leaves of the tree (or its variation) to the server to check if the product of durations is defined.
• The server uses the stored password to generate the same binary string as in the client, check and answers to the client.
• After some checks, if the server always answers correct, we can make sure the server is not a fake.
In this protocol, the password is not transferred through the network, it can not be exposed. Since on networks or internet, ones always assume there existence of thieves or attackers. They can only catch a sequence of durations which are different among different transactions. The complexity is to find the answer about the definition of the product is very high (complexity order of exponential function), the protocol can be seen safe.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper has introduced a new way to use the algebraic structure on durations in combining with Zero-knowledge for exchanging information. In the future works, ones can apply these results in security, network systems, or develop a new Zero-knowledge System based on some new durations product. This paper was supported by VNU University of Science (grant TN-13-02).
